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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to determine how the 
courts, between 1913 and the present time, have interpreted 
the concepts of corporate indebtedness and equity resulting 
from shareholder loans and investments. The problem was 
studied in relation to federal income taxation and is most 
common in closely held corporations. 
In determining a taxpayer's federal income tax liability 
an adversary position exists between the taxpayer and the 
representative of the federal government responsible for the 
enforcement of federal income tax laws. Within a given 
legal framework, the taxpayer's objective is to minimize 
his federal income tax liability while the objective of the 
representative of the federal government is to maximize 
federal income tax revenues. The problem under review 
develops when a corporation and/or its stockholders attempt 
to gain certain tax advantages without incurring any other 
substantive disadvantages. The courts have been called upon 
to decide the issue when the taxpayer and the representative 
of the federal government have been unable to reach an 
agreement. 
2 
The first part of the thesis deals with the adversary 
position stated above and with certain specific code sections, 
included in the study, wherein the problem arises. The 
remainder of the thesis presents the historical development 
of the court·s interpretation of the concepts of corporate 
indebtedness and equity resulting from shareholder loans and 
investments. The historical development was divided into 
three periods: (1) the period before 1946, (2) the period 
from 1946 to 1956, and (3) the period after 1956. Credit for 
the division points in the historical sequence is given to 
1Mortimer Caplin. 
Data and information for the thesis were derived 
primarily from court decisions. The decisions were collected 
from the United states Board of Tax Appeals and its successor 
the United states Tax Court, United States Circuit Courts of 
Appeal, United States District Courts, and the United States 
Supreme Court. Other important sources of information were 
provided by the Federal Internal Revenue Code and the regula­
tions and rulings of the Internal Revenue Service. 
The purpose of the thesis was to: 
1.	 To study factors and the weight given thereto by the 
courts in determining whether an instrument 
represented debt or equity. 
1Mortimer Caplin, "The Caloric Count of a Thin 
Incorporation," Proceedings of New York University (November 
17, 19.59), 774. 
2.	 To ascertain whether there has been a shift in 
emphasis on various facto.rs, by the courts, in a 
debt vs. equity determination, and 
J.	 To present a conclusion which would provide useful 
guidelines to those in the federal income tax 
field who counsel corporate managers concerning 
the tax impact of a proposed ·'thin corporation". 
CHAPTER II 
ADVERSARY POSITION OF PARTIES TO COURT ACTION 
A taxpayer with the objective of minimizing his 
federal income tax liability is, in effect, an adversary of 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue whose objective is to 
maximize the amount of federal income tax revenues collected. 
The stockholder of a closely held corporation operates in a 
dual capacity. He is both an individual taxpayer and a 
vested interest party in the affairs of the corporation as 
a taxpayer. To simplify the discussion of stockholder-indi­
vidual taxpayer interests it is assumed for purposes of this 
chapter, unless otherwise specified, that the stockholder 
being discussed owns 100 per cent of the stock of a closely 
held corporation. 
The stockholder will consider his individual interests 
and corporate interests in combination. A corporate financial 
structure that will cause the corporate tax liability to be 
decreased by an amount greater than the increase in his 
indiVidual tax liability will be chosen by the stockholder. 
Assume the stockholder, in addition to his stock investment, 
loans property to the corporation in which he is the sole 
stockholder. The corporation can pay interest on the loan 
and deduct the amount of interest expense from the corpora­
tion income tax return and a lower corporation income tax 
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liability will be the result. Assume instead that the 
stockholder invests additional property in the corporation 
in which he is the sole stockholder. The corporation may 
pay dividends on the additional stock investment, but the 
amount of dividends cannot be deducted from income. The 
stockholder, on his individual tax return, must recognize 
either the interest or dividends received as income. 
Receipt of dividend income by an individual taxpayer is 
usually given slight preferential tax treatment as opposed 
to the receipt of interest income by the same individual 
taxpayer. 
The loan of property to a corporation by the stock­
holder may be advantageous if the corporation goes bankrupt. 
A worthless loan may be deducted, by the stockholder, on 
his individual tax return as a bad debt. The issue of 
corporate indebtedness resulting from shareholder loans has 
arisen in connection with several provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code. The cases reviewed in this study will be 
limited to the prOVisions for an interest deduction by a 
corporate taxpayer, a bad debt deduction by an individual 
taxpayer, and the inclusion of indebtedness in invested 
capital under an earlier law. Excluded from this study are 
any cases involving the tax-free withdrawal of investment 
by stockholders, the significance of debt in connection with 
excess accumulation of corporate income, the significance 
of debt in relation to nontaxable transfers solely in 
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exchange for stock or securities and exchange of stock for 
debt under a tax-free recapitalization. 
The interest deduction by the corporate taxpayer and 
the bad debt deduction by the individual taxpayer have been 
discussed briefly above. A historical review of these 
provisions was not presented in this thesis. The brief 
explanation of these prOVisions is to indicate advantages 
the taxpayer may seek and why an adversary proceeding arises. 
Corporate indebtedness resulting from shareholder loans can 
give these advantages to a shareholder. 
The final provision of the law under review needs 
clarification. In some of the early cases presented in this 
stUdy it was advantageous for a corporate taxpayer to assert 
that debt securities represented U~vested capital". This 
issue arose because of a War-Profits and Excess Profits Tax 
Law. Under this law an additional tax was imposed on 
corporate income exceeding a certain level of invested 
capital. The Revenue Act of 1918 expressly excludes bor­
rowed capital in defining invested capital. Under that Act 
borrowed capital meant, "money or other property borrowed, 
whether represented by bonds, notes, open accounts, or other­
wise."1 This clarification is important because the adversary 
positions of the taxpayer and the Commissioner of Internal 
1united states Congress, Statutes, 65th Congress, Vol. 
XL, Part I, P.L. 254, Sec. 325 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1919), p. 1091. 
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Revenue were exactly opposite from the adversary positions, 
in the majority of cases, where the corporate interest 
deduction or a bad debt deduction by an individual were at 
issue. 
This brief chapter explains the adversary position of 
the parties involved in court proceedings. Subsequent 
chapters will deal directly with the interpretation the 
courts have given to the concepts of corporate indebtedness 
and equity resulting from shareholder loans and investments. 
CHAPTER III 
PERIOD FROM 1913 TO 1946 
This chapter presents a review of court cases between 
1913 and 1946. The period has been referred to as the 
"hybrid security era" • 1 This designation is derived because 
many of the securities reviewed by the courts had features 
common to both debt and equity instruments. In commenting 
on hybrid securities Mr. Uhlman states: 
While the parties sometimes thus create securities 
which might be called bmdd as well as shares of stock, 
it is the prOVince of the courts to draw the line of 
demarcation between creditor and enterpriser securities. 
Although in a given case the bond and stock features 
of an instrument seem to be hopelessly interwoven, the 
courts are called upon to untangle them and decide 
whether in the last analysis the bond or the stock 
character of the instrument prevails. For in the 
eyes of the law there are no hybrid securities. In 
the law a person is either a creditor or a stockholder, 
he cannot be both. 2 
The courts in determining the character of a security 
considered certain evidential factors. The factors the 
courts developed will be studied in turn. 
The courts were confronted with the basic proposition 
that the owner of a corporate security had to be either a 
1Caplin, supra at 2, at 775. 
2RUdolph E. Uhlman, "The Law of Hybrid Securities," 
23 WashinSton Univer$ity Law Quarterly, 182, 184 (1938). 
" ' 
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creditor or a stockholder. This point was referred to in 
the Appeal of I. Unterberg & Company wherein it was stated, 
"as counsel for the taxpayer says, they cannot be both stock 
1
and notes." The court opinions provided no comprehensive 
rule by which cases could be decided. In The Proctor Shop, 
Incorporated case the Board of Tax Appeals stated: 
None of the decided cases lay down any compre­
hensive rule by which the question presented may be 
decided in all cases, and the decision in each case 
turns upon the facts of that case. 2 
The courts considered all of the evidence presented and the 
real character of the instrument was determined by the 
court's examination of its terms and related circumstances. 
The name given to an instrument as well as the con­
sistency of using the name in the company records was 
considered by the courts in all cases. This is illustrated 
in the I. Unterberg & Company case when it was stated: 
In the corporation's opening journal entry it
 
is called a debenture note, on the face of the
 
instrument it is called a note, it bears the
 
documentary internal revenue stamps proper for a
 
note, and in the stockholder's agreement it is
 
called a debenture note.J
 
There was a strong presumption that an instrument was what it 
was called. This was brought out by the court in the Appeal 
1Appeal of I. Unterberg & Company, 2 B.T.A. 274, 280 
(192 5). 
2The Proctor ShOE, Incorporated, 30 B.T.A. 721, 725
 
(1934). ­
J Ap]2ealOf I. Unterberg & Company, 2 B.T.A. 274, 279
 
(1925) .
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of A. H. stange Company when it was stated: 
The presumption that instruments made in the form 
and language of debenture notes and issued by a 
newly organized corporation to the subscribers for 
its capital stock, and in an amount which, together 
with its authorized stock issue, equals the value 
of the properties turned over to the corporation 
at the instance of its organizers, represent bor­
rowed capital, can be oyercome, if at all, only 
by convincing evidence. 
The court made it clear in the Appeal of Leasehold 
Realty Company that material evidence would be required to 
overcome the presumption when it stated, "there is in this 
particular case no material evidence that this instrument 
is not what it purports to be on its face." 2 In the Appeal 
of Kentucky River Coal Corporation the name of the instrument 
was the first factor considered and the court stated, "the 
name of the instrument is not a thing to be ignored, for it 
is not lightly to be assumed that parties have given an 
erroneous name to their transaction."] In the Leasehold 
Realty Company case the court stated, "the name given to the 
instrument is not conclusive of its character and inquiry 
4
will be made as to its real character." This point was 
further emphasized in the opinion of the H. R. DeMilt 
Company case when it was stated: 
1APpeal of A. H. stange Company, 1 B.T.A. 58 (1924). 
2 A~real of Leasehold Realty Company, ] B.T.A. 1129, 
11J 1 (192 • 
644, 64~A1;;~2)~f Kentucky River Coal CO£Eoration, J B.T.A. 
4Appeal of Leasehold Realty Company, ] B.T.A. 1129
 
(1926) •
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The final determination must be made upon a legal 
interpretation of the meaning of the entire inst~ent 
and not upon the name by which it was denominated. 
The name of an instrument was one of several factors 
considered by the courts in determining its real character. 
The real character of an instrument was determined from the 
intent of the parties involved in the court action. In the 
cases thus far cited the court held that instruments named 
debenture notes and income debentures represented indebtedness 
and held that instruments named debenture stock and preferred 
stock represented equity. 
An interesting contrast was in the Proctor Shop case 
where the instrument was named debenture preference stock. 
In this case the father of the company president was Willing 
to loan money to the company but was not willing to invest 
in capital stock. So that the corporation's credit status 
would not be impaired, debenture preference stock was issued 
to him which was redeemed at a minimum of $1,500 per month 
with 6 per cent cumulative interest. In this case the court 
2 
held that the instrument represented indebtedness. 
The presence or absence of a fixed maturity date in an 
instrument has been considered by the courts as an important 
factor in determining the intent of the parties. In the 
1!!. R. DeMilt Company, 7 B.T.A. 7, 9 (1927). 
2The Proctor (hOE, InCOrporated, JO B.T.A. 721 (19J4)
 
aff1d, 82 F. 2d 792 9th Cir. 1930).
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H. R. DeMilt Company case the court stated, "we consider it 
significant that the instrument speaks of the principal as 
becoming due and payable on a particular date, though subject 
to payment at a prior date." 1 The court indicated that such 
terminology was more consistent with a loan than a capital 
stock arrangement. The Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding 
Corporation involved securities which were subordinated, both 
as to principal and interest, to the claims of all other 
creditors and the payment of interest could be suspended, 
though not beyond the fixed time when the principal was 
2payable. The court stressed the fixed maturity date and 
held that the instruments were in fact bonds. The instruments 
were held to be bonds in spite of the fact that the corporation 
had the option to redeem the bonds before the fixed maturity 
date and that the maturity date for the issue could be ex­
tended by a two-thirds majority vote of the bondholders. In 
Commissioner v. Schmoll Fils Associated, Inc., the same tri­
bunal again stressed the factor where the instruments did 
not have a fixed maturity date. The interest could be paid 
only from net profits and the debentures were subordinated 
to bank c~editors. In the opinion of the case the court 
stated: 
1H. R. DeMilt Company, 7 B.T.A. 7, 11 (192 7). 
2commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corporation, 76 F. 2d, 
11 (2d Cir. 19J5), affirming-30 B.T.A. 337 t1934). 
13
·, 
It is not necessary to hold that the absence of a 
maturity date if taken alone would prevent a document 
from representing an indebtedness or would invariably 
preclude the return from investments evidenced by the 
debentures from being treated as interest. 1 
The court held that the alleged debentures represented equity. 
In the Leasehold Realty Company case the court pointed out 
that a definite maturity date was not a characteristic 
2 
uncommon to preferred stock. This indicates that a fixed 
maturity date is not conclusive evidence that indebtedness 
has been created. 
During this period the courts considered a fixed 
maturity date an important factor indicating that an instru­
ment represented indebtedness, but the existence of a fixed 
maturity date alone was not conclusive evidence that a 
debtor-creditor relationship had been created. 
Certainty that the principal will be repaid has been 
considered by the courts as an important factor in determining 
whether an instrument represented indebtedness or equity. In 
the I. Unterberg & Company case the taxpayer contended that 
the instrument represented an equity interest. The debentures 
note under review promised to pay a certain sum to a definite 
person at a definite time, but the rights of the holder were 
subordinated to those of general creditors. The taxpayer's 
1Commissioner v. Schmoll FilS; Associated, Inc., 110 
F.	 2d, 611, 614 (2d Cir. 1940). 
2Appeal of Leasehold Realty Company, supra at 10. 
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contention that the instruments represented risk capital was 
based on the fact the debenture notes were subordinated to 
indebtedness held by general creditors. The court in holding 
that the condition of subordination alone did not warrant an 
equity determination when all the other factors indicated 
that the instruments were indebtedness, stated, "in other 
words, the dominant feature is said to be the condition and 
1
the risk and not the promise to pay". The debenture 
preference stock, in the Proctor Shop, Incorporated case, 
was also subordinated to general creditors. The corporation 
was obligated to repay principal monthly at a fixed rate and 
nonpaYment of interest for a two-year period rendered the 
corporation in default. Upon default by the corporation 
certificate holders had the right to institute action to 
collect the principal amount of the certificates plus accumu­
2lated interest. Subordination of stockholder held indebted­
ness to the claims of other creditors usually indicates that 
stockholder held indebtedness represents an equity interest. 
The subordination factor is only one of many factors considered 
by the courts, and as cited above, this factor alone may not 
prove that a stockholding interest existed. 
1Appeal of I. Unterb~rg & Company, 2 B.T.A. 274, 279 
(1925).
 
2 The Proctor Shop, Incorporated, supra at 11.
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A provision giving the stockholder-creditor the right 
to unconditionally demand repayment of principal at a 
specified time was considered by the courts as a factor 
indicating instruments represented indebtedness. In Jewel 
Tea Company v. United States repayment of principal could be 
demanded only in the event the company was liquidated. Some 
of the securities had been retired, but retirement of the 
securities was at the discretion of common stockholders and 
was dependent on accumulated corporate earnings. The court 
in holding that the instruments under review did not represent 
indebtedness stated: 
Possibly Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corporation 
does not commit us to the doctrine that shares must 
under all circumstances be debts when they contain a 
provision that the holder may unconditionally demand 
his money at a fixed time. All we now decide is that 
in the absence of such a provision the security can­
not be a debt. 1 
The instrument under review, in Leasehold Realty 
Company provided that the company would not conveyor 
encumber a certain leasehold without the consent of the 
instrument holders or incur indebtedness in excess of $1,500 
after a certain building was constructed. The holders of 
the instruments had the right to require liquidation of the 
company if there was a default on either of these provisions. 
The court indicated that these characteristics were not 
1Jewel Tea Company v. United States, 90 F. 2d, 451, 
453 (2d Cir. 1937). 
t!r-£------------------.~
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uncommon to preferred stock and held that the instruments in I~;4question represented equity interests. 1 i~ 
The certainty that principal will be repaid has been 
considered by the courts as an important factor indicating 
that instruments do represent indebtedness. In all the cases 
studied a definite obligation to pay a fixed sum has existed 
if the instruments have been held by the courts to represent 
indebtedness. The court clearly stated in O.P.P. Holding 
Corporation case that the "final criterion between creditor 
h~:-= 
2 Iand shareholder we believe to be the contingency of payment." The right of security holders to enforce payment of principal 
upon default, the intent to do so, absence of subordination 
clauses and having the debt secured have been indicated by ­
the courts as favorable factors indicating that instruments 
represent indebtedness. 
The payment of interest on indebtedness is an usual 
provision of an indebtedness agreement and the courts have 
examined each security to ascertain whether it provides with 
certainty that interest will be paid to the stockholder-
creditor. In several cases the return on alleged indebtedness 
was to be paid from the net profit of the corporation. In 
the Schmoll Fils Associated case the court stated: 
1Appeal £f Leasehold Realty Company, supra at 10. 
2 Commissioner v. O. P.P. Holding Goryoration, supra 
at 12, 76 F 2d at 12. 
17 
But here the absence of a maturity date, the 
obligation to pay income fro.m net earnings and the 
subordination of the debentures to the rights of 
bank creditors render the payments more like divi­
dends than interest and the securities like preferred 
stock rather than bonds. 1 
In the	 Jewel Tea Company case payment of interest on the 
securities could be required only out of corporate profits. 
The court held, as cited earlier, that the alleged indebted­
2 
ness represented equity. In the H. R. DeMilt Company case 
the court did not give much weight to the fact that interest 
was to be paid out of surplus or net profits and stated: 
We are concerned here with the principal itself, 
which is an enforcible lien against the assets of 
the corporation ~d which is subject to repayment 
in twenty years. 
In this case the court minimized the fact that interest was 
payable only from earnings and emphasized the fixed maturity 
date and the certainty that principal would be repaid. In 
Finance & Investment Corporation v. Commissioner instruments 
ware held to represent equity interests. In the opinion of 
the case the court stated: 
This conclusion follows from the fact that they 
were not entitled to demand a fixed rate of return 
upon their investment, but only such dividends not 
1Comrnissioner v. Schmoll Fils Associated, Inc., 110 
F.	 2d 611, ~14 (2d Cir. 1940). 
2 Jewell Tea Company, .fn£. J y. United States, 90 F. 2d 
451	 (2d Cir. 19J7). 
J H• R. DeMilt Company, 7 B.T.A. 7, 11 (192 7). 
''')"t~:-----------------1
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exceeding eight per cent per annum as were payable 
from the net earnings of the company. 1 
The court indicated that the payment of interest should be 
unconditional for a definitely ascertainable sum and with a 
fixed rate of interest. The presence of these three features 
in a security tend to indicate that the instruments represent 
indebtedness. In the O. P. P. Holding Corporation case pay­
ment of interest and principal was subordinate to the claims 
of all other creditors, the interest was at a fixed rate and 
cumulative, but the payment of interest could be deferred by 
the company. Even though the payment of interest could be 
suspended, at the option of the company, the obligation to 
pay interest at a future time existed. The court commented 
on this point when it stated, "the fact that ultimately he 
must be paid a definite sum at a fixed time marks his 
relationship to the corporation as that of a creditor rather 
2than shareholder." The court held that the debentures did 
represent indebtedness. 
In First Mortgage Corporation of Philadelphia v. 
Commissioner the court stated: 
A fixed rate of interest payable in the absence of 
profits is a normal characteristic of a debt. Although 
the rate of dividends upon the petitioner's preferred 
1Finance & Investment porporation ~. Commissioner, 57 
F. 2d, 444, 445 In.c. Cir. 1932). 
2Commissioner v. Q.f.f. Holding Corporation, supra at 
12, 76 F. 2d at 12. 
~
 ~1-·--------------- _r 
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stock is fixed, payment of the dividends may be made 
only if and when declared by the petitioner's board 
of directors. 1 
The court held that the obligations represented preferred 
stock rather than indebtedness. The right of security holders 
to enforce payment of interest on default, an unconditional 
promise to pay a definitely ascertainable amount of interest, 
a fixed interest rate and the payment of interest even 
though there were no corporate earnings have been indicated 
by the courts as favorable factors indicating that instruments 
represent indebtedness. The certainty that interest will be 
paid on a security w.as considered by the courts to be an 
important, but not conclusive, factor indicating debt in an 
indebtedness-equity determination. 
The right of security holders to vote has been viewed 
by the courts as a characteristic associated with an equity 
interest. Since it is not uncommon for preferred shareholders 
to be excluded from voting rights, this factor has been given 
limited weight by the courts. The courts have also varied in 
the conclusions that have been reached relative to the 
characteristic of voting rights. In the Schmoll Fils 
Associated, Inc. case the court stated, "while the debenture 
holders have no vote at meetings of the company, preferred 
2
stockholders sometimes have no such right." The three main 
1First Mortgage Corporation of Philadelphia v. Com­
missioner 13.5 F. 2d, 121, 124 (Jrd Cir. 194,3). 
2Commissioner v. Schmoll Fils Associated, Inc., 110 
F. 2d 611:61j(2d Ci~. T940). 
1~~ : 
\;::':2'1~~ 
fi€1 
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factors in the case considered by the court were the absence 
of a maturity date, the subordination agreement and the 
obligation to pay interest from net earnings. Tbe court 
seemed to minimize tbe fact that security holders did not 
have the right to vote. Tbe court held that the instruments ~ represented an equity interest. 
In the Kentucky River Coal Corporation case the ~""I I
holders of securities had no right to vote unless the corpora­
tion was in default on the payment of dividends on the 
securities. The court beld that the securities represented 
~ :,.,:­
stock, but the fact that security holders could not vote l~" 
1 i~; 
seemed to be given very little weight. 
t
If 
The courts discussed voting rights in the above two 
2 
cases and in one subsequent case presented in this chapter. 
It would appear that the courts considered the presence of t 
f};:'
;;;-:0voting rights indicative of a stockholding interest and the 
absence of voting rights indicative of a creditor interest. 
The courts did not place much emphasis on the factor of 
voting rights during this period. 
As discussed above, the courts considered a fixed rate 
of return on a security to be indicative of indebtedness. 
Conversely the right of a security holder to share in the 
1Aypeal of Kentucky River Coal Corporation, 3 B.T.A. 
644 (1926 • 
2parisian, Inc., v. Commissioner, 131 F. 2d 394 (5th 
Cir. 1942). 
21 
vprofits beyond a fixed rate of return has been considered by 
the courts to evidence an equity interest. 
In Haffenreffer Brewing Company v. Commissioner share­
holders were entitled to share equally in earnings with the 
common shareholders after each had received certain specified 
dividends. The court emphasized the sharing in profits beyond 
a fixed rate of return and the absence of a fixed maturity 
date in holding that the securities represented a capital 
1investment. The issue of sharing in the profits beyond a 
fixed rate was considered by a court, during this period, 
only in the above case. The right of a security holder to 
share in profits beyond a fixed rate was viewed by the court 
as a feature indicative of a stockholding interest. 
A bona fide business purpose for a corporation iSSUing 
indebtedness was considered by the courts as a factor indi­
eating the instruments represented indebtedness. In Proctor 
Shop, Inc. debenture preference stock was issued so the 
corporation's credit status would not be impaired. In com­
menting on the factor of business purpose the court stated: 
Here there was no usurious contract to be avoided, 
but there was a reason personal to the parties con­
cerned, namely, that Aaron Holtz was unwilling to 
become an investor in the corporation to be formed, 
but was willing to lend it money, and the transaction 
1Haffenreffer Brewing Company v. Commissioner, 116 
F. 2d, 465 ~lst Cir. 1940), cert. denied, JIJ U.S. 567 (1941), 
affirming 41 B.T.A. 443 (1940). 
22 
was placed in that form so as to preserve the 
corporation's credit. 1 
The court held that the instruments represented indebtedness. 
Ordinarily the substitution of stock for debt would be 
a factor indicating that the stock represents an equity 
interest. This was not so in the Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc. 
case in which preferred stock was substituted for indebted­
ness. The substitution of stock for debt resulted because 
the company was in financial trouble and desired to delay 
the installment payments due on the principal of the indebted­
ness. It was agreed that a fixed amount would be paid as 
interest if dividends on the preferred stock were not paid. 
When dividends were paid on the remainder of preferred shares 
held by others, the interest paid on stock substituted for 
debt was to be offset against dividends applicable to this 
stock. As a guarantee for the payment and redemption of the 
stock, principal and dividends, certain insurance policies 
were deposited with a trustee. The substitution of the 
stock for debt in effect postponed the payment of principal 
indefinitely. The court held that the preferred shares under 
2
review represented indebtedness. 
In two other cases the court found no business purpose 
for the substitution of stock for debt and held in both cases 
that the stock represented an equity interest. In Angelus 
1Commissioner v. Proctor Shop, Inc., 82 F. 2d, 792, 
795 (9th Cir. 1936). 
2The Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc., 37 B.T.A. 787 (193 8). 
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BUilding & Investment Company v. Commissioner one of the 
stockholders testifying on the substitution of stock for 
debt said, "we wanted to get it in more convenient form, and 
1 
we also wanted something behind that account." In ho[ding 
that the stock represented an equity interest the court stated, 
Ita taxpayer cannot by a form of book entry, merely change the 
2 
amount of an income total." In United states v. South 
Georgia Ry. Company stock was substituted for debt and the 
stockholders in a board resolution provided that the stock 
should constitute a lien on the assets of the corporation. 
This provision was not included in the stock certificates 
and in the court's opinion it was not included because it was 
not permissible under state law to secure the stock by a lien. 
The stock had been issued by the corporation as part of a 
general rearrangement of its capital structure to payoff its 
bonded debt. The court held that the stock represented an 
equity interest. 3 
The court in Arthur P. Jones Syndicate v. Commissioner 
viewed the circumventing of a state usury law as a business 
purpose for issuing securities as preferred stock even though 
the true nature of the instruments was indebtedness. In 
1Angelus Building & Investment Company x. Commissioner, 
57 F. 2d, 130, 131 (9th cir. 1932). cert. denied, 286 u.S. 
562 (1932), affirming 20 B.T.A. 667 (1930). 
2Ibid at 131. 
3United states v. South Georgia BY. Company, 107 F. 2d, 
3 (5th Cir. 1939). 
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discussing business purpose the court commented: 
A taxpayer who borrows money at a usurious rate 
of interest and who, to conceal the usury, is com­
pelled to execute a document which does not cor­
rectly describe the relationship of the parties, 
may, as against the government, disclose the true 
relationship of debtor and creditor. 1 
The court held the preferred shares represented indebtedness. 
Business purposes for transactions can be many and 
varied. The cases discussed above serve as examples of a 
business purpose, or the lack of a business purpose for a 
transaction. As has been mentioned above, the courts 
considered a bona fide business purpose for a transaction as 
a factor indicating indebtedness. Conversely the absence of 
a business purpose was at times considered a negative factor 
indicating a stockholding interest. 
During this period the courts considered the intent of 
the parties responsible for issuing a particular instrument 
significant. Each of the factors discussed above have been 
considered by the courts in determining the intent of the 
parties to a transaction. In addition to these factors 
evidence outside of the contract was admissible. In a case 
previously cited preferred stock was issued to circumvent state 
usury laws and the court said, "but the better reasoning 
sustains the view that a borrower whose necessities lead him 
to the door of a usurer may always show, by evidence aliunde 
1Arthur P. Jones Syndicate v. Comnlissioner, 2) F. 2d, 
8)3, 835 (7th Cir. 192 7). 
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the contract, the real character of the transaction. 1l1 As 
has been mentioned earlier, the court held that the securities 
2represented indebtedness. The	 Brush-Moore Newspapers case 
Jand the Proctor Shop, Inc. case are other good examples of 
the use of evidence aliunde the contract to establish the 
intent of the parties to a transaction. 
Some cases during this period emphasize the intent is 
important but do not elaborate on the issue as in the Appeal 
4
of I. Unterberg & Company. 
In Parisian, Inc. the court in discussing intent stated: 
The treating of instruments as shares of stock and 
periodical payments thereon as dividends by the cor­
poration, prior to the year in question, was evidence 
of intent indicating a stockholding relationship.5 
The issue of treating securities as shares of stock 
was discussed by the court in the South Georgia Ry. Company 
6 
case. There were other cases	 in which II intent 11 per se was 
not discussed. 
It is pointed out by Mr. Caplin that the intent of the 
parties was the primary issue considered by the courts during 
1Id . at 8J4.
 
2The Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc., supra at 21.
 
JCommissioner v. Proctor Shop, Inc., 82 F. 2d 792
 
(9thCir.19J6). 
4APpeal of I. Unterberg! Company, 2 B.T.A. 274 (1925). 
5parisian, Inc., v. Commissioner, supra at 20, 1J1 F. 
2d at 395). 
6United States v. South Georgia Ez. CompahYI supra at 
22. 
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this period and that: 
Ultimately all the corporation had to prove was 
that it intended to issue a debt security and this 
might be possible even though the insyrument bore 
the telling label of preferred stock. 
The concept of intent was considered by the courts to 
be very important during this period. The courts determined 
the intent of the parties by reference to the terms and 
conditions of the instrument and evidence outside of the 
contract. Even though the "real characterU2 of an instru­
ment was to be determined, the courts seemed to be dealing 
with the subjective intent of the parties to a transaction. 
In the opinion of the John Kelley Company case, which 
will be reviewed in the next chapter, reference was made to 
court decisions of the period under review when it was 
stated: 
The determining factors are usually listed as the 
names given to the certificates, the presence or 
absence of maturity date, the source of the payments, 
the rights to enforce the payment of principal and 
interest, participation in management, status equal 
to or inferior to that of regular corporate creditors, 
and intent of the parties. J 
The above factors were considered by the courts as 
the important factors in determining whether a corporate 
security represented indebtedness or equity. One factor 
was omitted in the quonation, namely, the right of the 
1caplin, supra at 2, at 776.
 
2APpeal of Leasehold ~ealty Company, supra at 10.
 
JJohn Kelley Company, 1 T.G. 457, 462 (194J).
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security holders to share in profits beyond a fixed rate of 
return. This factor and the right of security holders to vote 
seemed to be of minor importance to the courts during this 
period. Practically none of the court cases were clear cut. 
The court decisions sometimes gave great weight to one 
factor with little emphasis on other factors. 
The courts in determining intent of the parties relied 
mainly on the name given the instrument, the presence of a 
fixed maturity date for principal repayment, the certainty 
that principal would be repaid, the certainty that interest 
would be paid, business purpose as opposed to strictly tax 
avoidance and evidence outside of the contract. 
CHAPTER IV 
PERIOD FROM 1946 TO 1956 
This period has been referred to as the "age of 
. 1
rat2os". In the ratio referred to debt was the numerator 
and equity the denominator. The common method of determining 
the ratio was to compare the face amount of indebtedness 
held by stockholders to the fair market value of the net 
assets of the corporation. The fair market value of net 
assets included goodwill, unrealized appreciation of assets 
and other intangibles not recorded in the accounting records 
as well as the fair market value of equity recorded in the 
2books. In certain cases debt held by other creditors was 
included in indebtedness for purposes of computing the ratio~ 
This was illustrated by the Isidor Dobkin case.] In that case 
Dobkin and three associates each advanced $7,000 to Huguenot 
Estates, Inc. and in each instance $500 was designated equity 
and $6,500 as indebtedness. The corporate property was 
encumbered by first and second mortgages totaling $44,000. 
The indebtedness to stockholders of $26,000 was added to the 
amounts advanced by other lenders of $44,000, a total 
1Caplin, supra at 2, at 777. 
2Millers Estate v. Commissioner, 2J9 F. 2d, 729 
(9th Cir. 1956). 
Jxsidor Dobkin, 15 T.C. J1, JJ (1950). 
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indebtedness of approximately $70,000. The indebtedness of 
$70,000 was compared to the equity of $2,000, a debt-equity 
ratio of 35 to 1. 
In this chapter the use and application of the debt-
equity ratio by the courts was reviewed. Factors reviewed 
in the preceding chapter were also used by the courts during 
this period and new development of these factors was shown 
as they appeared in cases. The debt-equity ratio represented 
a new criterion used by the courts and its emphasis in this 
chapter was justified by the great weight it was given by 
the courts. 
The concept of the debt-equity ratio had its genesis 
in the dictum of John Kelley Company v. Commissioner, when 
Mr. Justice Reed stated in the Supreme Court opinion: 
As material amounts of capital were invested in 
stock, we need not consider the effect of extreme 
situations such as nominal stock investments and an 
obviously excessive debt structure. 1 
Even though the court did not find it necessary to use 
the debt-equity ratio test in the John Kelley Company case, 
a standard had been promulgated which was used repeatedly by 
the courts during this period. In the past courts had relied 
on the terms and conditions of the instrument, as well as 
evidence aliunde, to determine the intent of the parties. In 
many instances a case turned on one or several factors which 
1John Kelley com~any v. Commissioner, 326 u.s. 521, 
526 (194~reversing 1 6 F.-2d 466 (7th Cir. 1944), reversing 
1 T.C. 457 (194J). 
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were afforded great weight by the courts, to the exclusion of 
other factors. The process of comparing and weighing factors 
lacked objectivity. The ratio test offered an apparent 
quality of objectivity. 
Courts considering the debt-equity issue in this 
period were required to determine what represented a "nominal 
stock investment" and an "obviously excessive debt structure". 
The usual meaning of nominal is something so small and in­
significant that it is scarcely entitled to bear the name 
thereof. Excessive, as customarily used, is something 
exceeding that which is usual, normal, and reasonable. These 
meanings provide little in explaining what the court in the 
John Kelley Company case meant and only help in designating 
the problem that future courts would face in interpreting the 
terms. Cases of this period were reviewed to determine the 
interpretation given these terms and the application thereof 
by the courts. 
The review will begin with a more detailed examination 
1
of the John Kelley Company case, and Talbot Mills v. Com­
2
missioner which were reviewed together by the Supreme Court. 
In the John Kelley Company case the Tax Court held that the 
securities in question represented indebtedness. The Tax 
1Ibid . 
2Talbot Mills v. Commissioner, J26 U.S. 521 (1946), 
affirming 14b F. 2d 809 (1st Cir. 1944), affirming J T.C. 
95 (1944). 
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Court decision was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 
but was upheld by the Supreme Court. In the Talbot Mills 
case the Tax Court ruled that the securities in question 
represented equity and the decision was affirmed by the 
Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. 
In the John Kelley Company case the debt-equity ratio 
was approximately .2 to 1, while in the Talbot Mills case 
the debt-equity ratio was 4 to 1. The debt-equity ratio in 
1
the latter case has been referred to as 4 to 1 , but book 
value instead of the fair market value of net assets was used 
in computing the debt-equity ratio. The debt-equity ratio 
in the former case was computed by the writer on the basis 
of book value. It would have been a coincidence if the debt-
equity ratio using book value of net assets and fair market 
value of net assets respectively as the denominators pro­
duced the same results, but "a belief developed that a 4:1 
2debt-equity ratio would clearly be safe." Since in the 
Talbot Mills case Mr. Justice Reed did not consider debt of 
$400,000 excessive nor did he consider equity of $100,000 
nominal, it followed that taxpayers might view the 4:1 debt-
equity ratio as a conservative guideline. 
The factors present in the Talbot Mills case which 
distinguished it from the John Kelley Company case were a 
1caplin, supra at 2, at 783.
 
2Ibid •
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variable annual return on the securities with a minimum rate 
of two per cent and the fact that issuance of the securities 
was limited to stockholders who exchanged stock for the 
purported indebtedness. The similarity of characteristics 
of the two securities is striking. In the John Kelley Company ~j 
case the securities were named income debentures, had a fixed 
maturity date 20 years hence, were subordinated to claims of 
all creditors with a collection procedure for certain 
designated defaults, paid an 8 per cent noncumulative rate of 
return strictly from earnings, had no voting rights, and did 
not share in profits beyond the fixed rate. In the Talbot 
Mills case the securities were called registered notes, had 
a fixed maturity date 25 years hence, were subject to sub­
ordination to and in fact were subordinated to claims of 
outside creditors, had certain restrictions on the right of 
the corporation to mortgage real assets, paid a variable rate 
of return from 2 per cent to 10 per cent computed with refer­
ence to earnings, interest was cumulative but could be 
deferred, had no voting rights, and did not share in profits 
beyond the computed variable rate. There were recapitaliza­
tions in both cases. The Tax Court, in the Talbot Mills case, 
seemed to stress the lack of any business purpose for the 
recapitalization and conversely the motive of tax avoidance 
by the parties to the transaction. Judge Turner in presenting 
the opinion of the Tax Court, in the John Kelley Company case, 
was much more liberal on the factor of business purpose as 
he stated: 
It is apparent that the holders of the preferred 
stock in exchanging the stock for "20 year 8 per cent 
income debentures" preferred the debt or-creditor 
status of debenture holders to that of stockholders , 
and stockholders have the right to change to the 
creditor-debtor basis, though the leason may be purely 
personal to the parties concerned. 
The Supreme Court did not comment on business purpose 
or tax avoidance in reviewing the cases. The facts in both 
cases were very similar and in one case the securities were 
held to represent debt and in the other case equity. 
SUbsequent court cases were reviewed to ascertain whether 
the debt-equity ratio was a reliable and safe criterion to 
follow. 
The Isidor Dobkin case involved a debt-equity ratio 
of 35:1 including debt to oursiders and a 13.5:1 considering 
only stockholder debt. The Tax Court referred to the debt-
equity ratio as 35:1 and held that stockholder debt repre­
sented equity. The capital stock of $2,000 was considered 
nominal and debt of $70,000 was considered excessive. The 
amounts advanced by stockholders and designated as debt were 
in direct proportion to their stockholdings which was a factor 
. 2the court felt indicated that advances were equ2ty. 
An extremely high debt-equity ratio of 1,250:1 was 
present in the Swoby Corporation case. The corporation 
1John Kelley Company, 1 T.G. 457, 462 (1943). 
2Isidor Dobkin, 15 T.G. 31 (1950), affirmed per 
curiam 192 F. 2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951). 
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issued an income debenture of $250,000 and capital stock of 
$200 to a sole stockholder in exchange for property that had 
a fair market value of at least $250,200. The Tax Court 
relied heavily on the Supreme Court decision in the John 
Kelley Company case and decided that $250,000 of indebtedness 
was obviously excessive and $200 of capital stock was 
nominal. The income debenture had a definite 99 year 
maturity date, and the court indicated that a maturity 99 
years hence was not in the reasonable future. The securities 
were unsecured, subordinate to claims of all creditors, pay­
ment of interest depended on corporate earnings and were 
collectible by the holder, if at all, only on dissolution. 
The Tax Court held that the purported indebtedness represented 
1
equity. 
In Alfred R. Bachrach petitioner advanced $2,667.71 to 
the Est Realty Company, Inc., $200 designated as capital 
stock and $2,467.71 recorded in the books as loans payable on 
open account. Among his three associates an additional 
$13,338.56 was advanced, $1,000 designated as capital stock 
and $12,338.56 designated as loans payable. The proportion 
of debt to equity was the same for each stockholder. The 
debt-equity ratio was 12 to 1. In this case no note was given, 
no interest was paid and there was not a fixed maturity date. 
It was emphasized that the capital contribution was so 
1Swoby Corporation, 9 T.C., 887 (1947). 
~l~i----------­
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nominal that it was inadequate for funding the purchase of 
property necessary to begin business operations. The Tax 
Court held that the purported indebtedness was a capital 
contribution and very specifically indicated that the 
1corporation was undercapitalized. 
Mullin Building Corporation involved the transfer of 
certain real property by a family to a newly organized corpora­
tion in exchange for capital stock. Capital stock of 
$300,000 was issued to the family, $10,000 designated as 
common stock and $290,000 designated as debenture preferred 
stock. The taxpayer contended that the debenture preferred 
stock was indebtedness. The debt-equity ratio was 29:1. 
The securities had no fixed maturity date, were unsecured, 
had a lower priority than other indebtedness, had a very 
limited collection procedure in the event of default, paid 
5 per cent cumulative interest, had no vGting rights, and did 
not share in earnings be¥ond the fixed rate. The Tax Court 
found the latter point was more illusory than real since all 
earnings came from the rental of the one main asset, the 
building, and any payments to stockholders had to come from 
corporate earnings. A major portion of the building was 
rented to another family corporation in the clothing business. 
The instruments contained no prOVision for the enforcement of 
1Alfred R. Bachrach, 18 T.C., 479 (1952), affirmed per 
curiam 167 F, 2d 1001 (Jrd Gir. 1948). 
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shareholders did notprincipal payments. The court felt the 
desire to enforce payment of principal. The Tax Court held 
that the securities represented equity. 1 
In Erard A. Matthiessen a corporation with a debt­
equity ratio of 6:1 was considered by the Tax Court to be 
undercapitalized. Funds advanced by stockholders and 
designated as indebtedness totaled $76,983 together with 
capital stock of $12,000. The fact that the notes were un­
secured and the inadequate capitalization of the corporation 
were the key factors the court considered in holding that 
2
the alleged indebtedness represented risk capital. 
In each of the five preceding cases securities 
designated as indebtedness were held to be equity. The factor 
of a high debt-equity ratio was certainly not the only factor 
relevant to the issue, but was definitely considered as an 
important factor. The corporations in these five cases were 
undercapitalized at the time the corporation was organized 
which is in contrast to the John Kelly Company and Talbot 
Mills cases which involved recapitalizations. Ordinarily 
stockholders invest the funds necessary to finance the 
purchase of assets necessary to operate the business. This 
usually includes working capital, organizational costs, and 
a substantial portion of the fixed assets. In many cases 
1Mullin Building Corporation, 9 T.C., 350 (194 7) 
affirmed per curiam 167 F. 2d 1001 (3rd Cir. 1948). 
2Erard A. Matthiessen, 16 T.C., 781 (1951), affirmed 
194 F. 2d 659 (2d Gir. 1952). 
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if land and plant are purchased these assets may be mortgaged 
with funds provided by lenders. It is important to note that 
stockholder investments usually provide the risk capital 
which gives a buffer of protection to creditors. This fact 
was noted in the opinion of Isidor Dobkin when the court 
stated: 
When the organizers of a new enterprise arbitrarily 
designate as loans the major portion of the funds they 
layout in order to get the business established and 
under way a strong inference arises that the entire 
amount paid in is a contribution to the corporation's 
capital and is placed at risk in the business. 1 
At the time of incorporation in 1929 real property 
with a fair market value of at least $2,700,000 was trans­
ferred to the Ruspyn Corporation in exchange for gold 
debenture bonds with a face value of $2,100,000 and capital 
stock with a par value of $600,000. The court cited the 4:1 
ratio in the John Kelly Company case and decided the case 
under review had passed the debt-equity ratio test with a 
3.5:1 ratio. It was also noted that $600,000 represented 
a substantial stock investment. In comparing this case to 
the John Kelley Company case the court was aware that the 
4:1 debt-equity ratio computed on the basis of book values 
was not correct and the debt-equity ratio was computed using 
actual values. The Tax Court held that the securities 
represented indebtedness. The reasons for holding that the 
security represented debt were the absence of voting power, 
1Isidor Dobkin, supra at JJ, 15 T.C. at J1. 
38 
the transferability of bonds without regard to the stock, a 
specific maturity date 89 years hence and a business purpose 
for the transaction. The specific maturity date of 89 years 
hence would appear to be in conflict with the Swoby Corpora­
tion case where 99 years was deemed not to be in the reason­
1
able future. 
In Cleveland Adolph Mayer Realty Corporation real 
property was transferred from a former corporation to a newly 
organized corporation. The fair market value of the property 
transferred was in excess of $300,000 with an approximate 
value of $365,000. The shares of stock in the former 
corporation were exchanged for capital stock and debentures 
in the newly organized corporation. Three hundred shares of 
capital stock with a par value of $2 per share and debentures 
with a principal amount of $210,000 were issued to the stock­
holders who were parties to the exchange. The exact debt-
equity ratio was not stated in the case, but using the range 
of values shown above the debt-equity ratio would range from 
2.3:1 to 1.4:1. Either debt-equity ratio was below the 4:1 
ratio established in the John Kelley Company case. The 
debentures in question had no voting rights, were freely 
transferable independent of the capital stock, paid six per 
cent interest monthly without regard to earnings, had a fixed 
ma.turity date eight years hence, unless lessee exercised an 
1RUspyn Corporation, 18 T.G., 769 (1952 ) 
11 year option renewal, and in that case the maturity date 
would be 19 years later. In the court's opinion a business 
purpose for the transaction was discussed in a circuitous 
way, but was not satisfactorily explained. The respondent 
pointed out that the petitioner was not interested in borrow­
ing money as it could have been borrowed on a first mortgage 
at Dper cent interest or less. The court felt that this 
factor was immaterial. The Tax Court held that securities 
in question did represent indebtedness. 1 
In holding that debenture bonds of petitioner repre­
sented indebtedness the Tax Court pointed out in New England 
Lime Company that there was a substantial amount invested in 
capital stock. Common stock was listed on the balance sheet 
without a stated value, but the petitioner was able to prove 
that in 1941 and 1942 that had been sales of common stock at 
prices ranging from 50¢ to $2 per share. A debt-equity ratio 
was not computed and the case does not prOVide enough informa­
tion to compute the ratio. There were debenture bonds out­
standing at December 31, 1941 of $538,100, but the court did 
not speak to the issue of an excessive debt structure. The 
court was satisfied that there was a substantial stock 
investment. Favorable characteristics of the debenture bonds 
included issuances in both registered and coupon form, a 
fixed maturity date 25 years hence, a set interest payment of 
1Cleveland Adolph Mayer Realty Corporation, 6 T.C., 
730 (1946), reversed on other grounds, 160 F. 2d 1012 (6th 
Cir. 1947). 
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J per cent with an additional J per cent unqualifiedly fixed 
if earned, wide and disproportionate distribution of stocks 
and bonds, and shift of voting power to common stockholders. 
The court felt that the desire to give the officers and 
others voting rights on their common shares was a clear 
business purpose. It is interesting to note that management 
in connection with the exchange of preferred shares for 
debenture bonds pointed out to the preferred shareholders 
that interest on the debenture bonds could be deducted for 
1federal income tax purposes. 
In Gazette Telegraph Company there was stockholder 
held indebtedness of $250,000 and capital stock of $250,000, 
a debt-equity ratio of 1:1. The Tax Court decided that this 
was not a case of thin capitalization. The securities were 
called notes payable, paid a 5 per cent rate of return and 
had a ten year maturity date. The family members who repre­
sented the stockholding interest in the corporation were also 
stockholders in several other family corporations operating 
newspapers. The stockholders indicated that the indebtedness 
served several business purposes. The indebtedness provided 
necessary liquid funds for future business expansion or the 
payment of estate and inheritance taxes should one of the 
shareholders die. The indebtedness was also better than 
stock as collateral for borrowing and in the event of 
1New England Lime Company, 13 T.C., 799 (1949). 
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bankruptcy shareholder held debt would be on a par with other 
unsecured indebtedness. The family wanted to be able to 
withdraw funds without a change in the proportion of equity 
owneuShip. The Tax Court held that the notes payable repre­
f. 
sented bona fide indebtedness. Several other interesting 
points were present in this case. Initially $500,000 was 
borrowed from the, Bank of America. The bank required that 
certain family members and another family corporation sign 
individual notes and pledge securities they owned as collat­
eral. Originally the family had purchased the stock of an 
existing corporation and immediately liquidated the corporation 
and assets were distributed to the buyers as tenants in com­
mono Subsequently assets were transferred to petitioner in 
exchange for $250,000 stock, $250,000 notes payable to the 
family shareholders, and $410,000 payable to the Bank of 
America. When the $410,000 bank loan became due a new loan 
of $400,000 was made by the same bank. The bank did require 
one of the family corporations be jointly liable on the 
$400,000 loan since the bank needed additional security. 
Originally the respondent contended that the bank loan 
also represented an equity interest, but later dropped that 
contention. The debt-equity ratio, including the Bank of 
America loan, was approximately 2.6:1. The facts presented 
indicated a $250,000 capital structure was adequate to 
operate the business and meet the requirements of paper 
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suppliers, news services, and syndicates. 1 
The preceding four cases provide examples of low debt-
equity ratios and in each case the Tax Court held that the 
securities represented indebtedness. The Tax Court in each 
of the cases dealt with the issue of substantial as opposed 
to nominal stock investments. In three of the cases a debt-
equity ratio was calculated and discussed. There was much 
less emphasis on the debt-equity ratio in these cases than 
there was in cases with high debt-equity ratios. The Tax 
Court followed a 4:1 standard for the debt-equity ratio. In 
these cases the court simply cited the John Kelley Company 
case and noted that the standard of 4:1 established in that 
case had been met. 
Thus far there has been a close correlation between 
decisions rendered by the Tax Court and the 4:1 debt-equity 
ratio standard established in the John Kelley Company case. 
In the cases with debt-equity ratios in excess of 4:1 the 
Tax Court has consistently held that securities represented 
equity. In cases with debt-equity ratios less than 4:1, the 
Tax Court has consistently held that securities represented 
indebtedness. The debt-equity ratio in the New England Lime 
Company case may have exceeded a 4:1 ratio. In that case 
the court emphasized the substantial stock investment without 
1Gazette Telegraph Company, 19 T.C., 692 (1953), 
affirmed on other grounds, 209 F. 2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954). 
computing a debt-equity ratio. Review of the following cases 
will indicate that the 4:1 debt-equity ratio standard was not 
consistently followed by the Tax Court. 
In The Toledo Blade Company a recapitalization plan 
provided for the issuance of $3,000,000 of debentures and 
$500,000 of common stock by a wholly owned subsidiary 
corporation to its parent corporation in exchange for the 
outstanding shares of capital stock. The Tax Court felt 
there was no question that the debentures were genuine and 
evidenced legal obligations of the subsidiary corporation. 
The debentures had a fixed maturity date of six years, bore 
interest at 7 per cent, and principal and interest were both 
unconditionally payable. The Tax Court felt that the facts 
presented in this case followed the pattern of the John 
Kelley Company and Cleveland Adolph Mayer Realty Corporation. 
A debt-equity ratio was not shown in the Tax Court opinion, 
but the ratio was 6:1. This debt-equity ratio exceeds the 
4:1 standard which had been used by the Tax Court. The 
respondent in the case felt that the whole transaction was a 
sham and was motivated because of tax savings rather than 
any bona fide business purpose. In rejecting the validity 
of the business purpose test the Tax Court cited the John 
Kelley Company case where the right of stockholders to 
convert to a creditor-debtor relationship for purely 
::1'lBI~--------------_
 _._.._ 
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personal reasons was upheld. The Tax Court held that	 the 
1alleged debentures did in fact represent indebtedness. 
In Arthur V. McDermott eight heirs of an estate con­
veyed certain real property, valued at $108,418, to a 
corporation in exchange for unsecured promissory notes. 
Each heir was issued a note for $12,500 and three of the 
heirs were issued additional notes totaling $8,418. Certain 
liquid assets valued at $5,533.36 were transferred by the 
heirs to the corporation and each of the heirs was issued 
five shares of no par value common stock. The notes pro­
vided for a 6 per cent interest rate, were unsecured, were 
payable on demand except five of the eight noteholders had 
to join in a demand for payment. The debt-equity ratio in 
this case was approximately 20:1. In referring to the fact 
that stock was issued in exchange for personal property and 
notes were issued for real property it was stated: 
The notes and the stock were issued for entirely 
distinct kinds of p~operty, which indicates rather 
clearly the intent of the heirs to differentiate 
between their respective interests as creditors and 
as stockholders. 2 
The disproportion between the debt and equity interests of 
the stockholders, caused by the issuance of $8,418 of 
additional notes among three of the heirs, was viewed 
1The Toledo Blade Company, 11 T.G., 1079 (1948), 
affirmed on other grounds. 180 F. 2d 357 (6th Gir. 1950), 
cart. denied 340 u.s. 811 (1950). 
2Arthur V. McDermott, 13 T.G., 468, 47 1 (1949). 
{~rl;2.--------------_··•••••••••••••I_~ ~ .. 
favorably by the court. A business purpose was offered for 
organizing the corporation, but no business purpose was 
established for the issuance of a substantial amount of debt. 
Business purpose was not discussed in the Tax Court's 
opinion. Intent was discussed at great length and in this 
regard it was indicated that interest was consistently paid 
on the notes which showed the intent of the parties con­
eerned. The Tax Court held that the securities in this case 
1did represent indebtedness. 
The cases presented in this chapter indicate that the 
courts continued to judge cases on the basis of the factors 
presented in the preceding chapter, but added the debt-
equity ratio as an additional factor. The debt-equity ratio 
had its beginning in the dictum of the John Kelley Company 
case and was considered by the courts in the majority of 
cases reviewed in this chapter. As has been shown, the debt-
equity ratio of 4:1 developed from the Talbot Mills case, 
a companion to the John Kelley Company case in the Supreme 
Court. The standard of a 4:1 debt-equity ratio was not 
always followed, but was used with a degree of consistency. 
The necessity of a bona fide business purpose for 
issuing stockholder held indebtedness was not consistently 
required by the courts. In some cases a bona fide business 
purpose seemed to be a very strong factor influencing the 
1Ibid ., at 468. 
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In other casescourt's decision favorable to the taxpayer. 
the lack of a business purpose seemed instrumental in the 
court's rendering a decision unfavorable to the taxpayer. In 
other cases business purpose was ignored, while in one case 
it was indicated that if stockholders wanted to change from 
a stockholding interest to a creditor interest it was purely 
a personal matter. 
Several other developments of this period were 
interesting. When both debt and equity instruments are 
issued by a corporation to its stockholders in exchange for 
property the portion of the property applicable to each 
should be identified. The same proportion of debt to equity 
for each stockholder has been viewed by the courts as an 
indication that alleged debt represented equity. One case 
involved the use of two types of debt instruments which was 
looked upon favorably by the court. Bank borrowing by a 
corporation with individual stockholders guaranteeing the 
loan was illustrated in one case. 
The activity of the courts between 1946 and 1956 
indicated an emphasis on material amounts of equity, 
realistic debt structures, and confusion concerning the 
necessity for a business purpose. 
CHAPTER V 
PERIOD FROM 1956 TO PRESENT 
Prior to this period the courts had developed certain 
criteria which were used in determining whether property 
transferred to a closely held corporation by its stock­
holders created a debtor-creditor relationship or a stock­
holding relationship. The factors established by the 
courts have been reviewed in the preceding chapters. During 
a ten-year period immediately prior to the current period 
the courts emphasized the factor of the debt-equity ratio 
in deciding whether a security represented indebtedness or 
equity. The court's interpretation of the debt-equity issue 
will be reviewed in this chapter with emphasis on new 
developments representing either additional factors or 
changing emphasis on established criteria used by the courts. 
In 1946 petitioner corporation, Gooding Amusement 
1Company, was organized. At the time the corporation was 
organized a husband, his wife, and daughter were the only 
stockholders. Prior to 194J the family had conducted the 
same basic business operation as a corporation. From 194J 
to 1946 the three stockholders had operated substantially 
1Gooding Amusement Company, 2J T.C. 408 (1954), 
affirmed 2J6 F. 2d 159 (6th Cir. 195 6), cert. denied J52 
U.S. 10J1 (1957). 
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the same business operation as a partnership. The partner­
ship interests of the husband, wife, and infant daughter were 
respectively, four-sevenths, two-sevenths, and one-seventh. 
In 1946, concurrently, with the distribution of the partner­
ship assets, the partners exchanged the distributed assets 
for shares of stock and notes payable of the newly organized 
corporation. The distributed partnership assets were 
appraised and exchanged, to the corporation, for a higher 
value than had been recorded on the partnership books. In 
exchange for the assets received by the corporation no-par 
common stock with a total stated value of $49,000, and notes 
payable of approximately $232,000 were issued to the husband, 
wife, and daughter with both issuances prorated four-sevenths 
to the husband, three-sevenths to the wife, and one-seventh 
to the daughter. 
The Tax Court in their opinion discussed the debt-
equity ratio. The Tax Court indicated if a reasonable value 
was attributed to goodwill, the debt-equity ratio was ap­
proximately 1:1. The Tax Court noted that the debt-equity 
ratio was one of several criteria which should be considered 
in determining the presence or absence of a debtor-creditor 
relationship, but this criterion alone was not decisive. 
The factor of a bona fide business purpose for the 
transaction was also discussed by the Tax Court. An officer 
of Gooding Amusement Company contended that the risks 
attendant to the operation of an amusement business subjected 
that 
been 
extent 
assets 
were 
the corporation to the possibility of liability so great 
the business could have become insolvent. The stockholder-
creditors, in the event of insolvency, could then have 
on a par with other unsecured general creditors to the 
of their notes and recoup some portion of the corporate 
which would probably not have been the case if they 
stockholders only. The Tax Court noted that the liability 
insurance carried appeared to be adequate to cover claims 
that could occur as the result of accidents. The Tax Court 
also pointed out that in 1943, only three years prior to 
1946, when the risk of liability because of accidents was about 
the same, the stockholders of petitioner corporation had con­
verted from a corporate organization to a partnership organi­
zation. Petitioner corporation indicated that it was 
necessary to keep the capitalization comparatively small so 
shares of stock could be issued to key employees. The Tax 
Court saw no reason why this objective could not have been 
achieved regardless of the amount of corporate capitalization. 
The Tax Court indicated that the formal attributes of 
indebtedness had been satisfied by the terms and conditions 
of the notes. The notes represented an unconditional 
promise to pay a definite amount at a fixed time, with 
interest payable at a fixed rate and in all instances. 
The form of the notes satisfied the Tax Court, but 
the substance of the transaction did not. In the Tax Court's 
opinion the most significant aspect of this case was lithe 
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the three 
corporation.n1 
stockholders, the 
complete identity of interest between and among 
noteholders, coupled with their control of the 
The Tax Court pointed out that two of the 
wife and daughter, had not intended and, in fact, had not, 
operated independently in enforcing the payment of notes 
they held. The major stockholder did not intend to enforce 
payment of the notes if it would impair the corporation's 
credit rating, cause the corporation to borrow funds from 
other sources to payoff the notes, or bring about the dis­
solution of the corporation. The notes had been subordinated 
to claims of other creditors and had not been repaid at 
ma~urity. 
In its opinion the Tax Court summarized the cogent fac­
tors of the case when it stated: 
The only substantial purpose motivating the trans­
action was one of tax avoidance. When this fact is 
considered, together with the extent to which the 
notes were subordinated to the claims of creditors, 
the reality of the amenability of petitioner's wife 
and infant daughter to his desires in respect of the 
notes, and the absence from the transaction of any 
true borrowing element or new contribution to the 
enterprise, we must conclude that no indebtedne~s 
arose between the Goodings and the corporation. 
In this case the Tax Court emphasized the lack of a 
bona fide business purpose for the issuance of notes to the 
stockholders and gave no special weight to the absence of an 
1000qing Amusement Company, supra at 43, 23 T.C. at 
418. 
2 Ibid ., at 421. 
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a substantial 
the Tax Court 
stockholder-creditors 
of Appeals 
1 The ~ase 
excessive debt structure and the presence of 
stock investment. The new factor presented by 
was the identity of interest among the 
combined with their control of corporate affairs. 
The Jaase was appealed to a Circuit Court 
and the decision of the Tax Court was affirmed. 
was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, but 
2
certiorari was denied. 
The courts continued to consider the intent of the 
stockholder-creditor in determining whether an instrument 
evidenced indebtedness or equity. The court indicated in 
Fellinger v. United States that: 
determination of a taxpayer's intent rests upon 
his objective intent as disclosed by the various 
factors in the case and not just upon his own formal 
manifestations.3 
In the Fellinger case the stockholder-creditors were 
issued both bonds and stock as a package. The testimony of 
stockholders supported the court's finding that the stock­
holders would not have advanced money to the corporation 
unless they acquired an ownership interest therein. The 
fact that a sinking fund had not been prOVided by the corpora­
tion to retire the bonds at maturity was considered by the 
1aOoding Amusement company v. ~mmissioner, 236 F. 2d, 
159 (6th Cir. 1956). 
2 Gooding Amusement Company v. Commissioner, 352 U.S., 
10Jl (1957). 
3Felli~ger v. United States, 2JB F. Supp., 67, 75 
(1946) •
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court as one of the criteria indicating that the bonds 
represented equity. The bondholders had voting rights which 
required 75 per cent in the amount of bonds to vote and de­
clare the bonds due and payable if the corporation was in 
default and a vote of the same percentage in the amount of 
bonds could alter the provisions of the bonds. Evidence in 
the case indicated that bond repayments were dependent on 
1
corporate earnings. 
The preceding case involved onB of the stockholders 
of The Hippodrome BUilding Company and the taxability of 
certain income on his individual tax return. Essentially 
the same facts were considered by the Tax Court in a case 
in which The Hippodrome BUilding Company was the plaintiff. 
The Tax Court emphasized the subordination of the bonds 
to interests of other creditors. The Tax Court in referring 
to funds advanced by the stockholders stated: 
It is obvious that the funds supplied by the Babin 
group did not constitute an addition to adequately 
existing operating capital, but represented instead 
an advance of necessary working capital without 
which the corporation would not have been able to 
continue. 2 
other than the above points the opinion of the Tax Court was 
essentially the same as that of the District Court in the 
JFellinger case. 
1Ibid ., at 67. 
65~~~~ 1~~~~)~ome Building Company, P.R. Memo T.C., 65­
125, 
J Ibid., at 65-125. 
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Both of the two preceding cases were appealed to the 
1United States Court of Appeals. The decisions in both cases 
were affirmed and accordingly the bonds in question were held 
to represent equity interests. 
2In Broadway Drive-In Theatre, Inc., v. United States 
the testimony of corporate stockholders was revealing. One 
stockholder testified that he did not expect to have his 
loans paid back if the business was unsuccessful and another 
stockholder testified that the first loan by stockholders 
was made so the corporation would have some capital to operate 
the business. In addition to the testimony, cash flow state­
ments for the corporation indicated that negative cash balances 
would have reSUlted if the stockholders had not loaned the 
corporation money. Without the stockholder loans, regular 
operating expenses and the construction costs of the drive-in 
movie theatre could not have been paid. The corporation's 
debt-equity ratio is closely related to the preceding issue. 
At the time the corporation was organized, or within a few 
months, the stockholders advanced $43,140, and the corpora­
tion issued promissory notes for $42,640 and common stock of 
$500. Considering only stockholder held debt, the debt-equity 
ratio was approximately 85 to 1. If all corporate debt was 
included, the debt-equity ratio was 411 to 1. 
1Fellinger~. United States, 363 F. 2d, 827 (6th Gir. 
1966), affirming 2J8 F. SuPP.· 67 {1964). 
2Broadway Drive-In Theatre, Inc. y. United States, 220 
F. Supp. 707 (1963). 
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No evidence was presented to the court concerning a 
bona fide business purpose for the stockholders loaning money 
to the corporation instead of investing capital. The court 
recognized that the alleged instruments of indebtedness were 
in form evidences of a debt. The promissory notes provided 
for a definite interest payment, a fixed maturity date and 
were negotiable. 
The court held that the stockholder-held promissory 
notes of Broadway Drive-In Theatre represented equity. In 
addition to the negative criteria mentioned above, the court 
indicated that several other factors were detrimental to the 
taxpayer in attempting to prove his case. Initially the money 
received by the corporation from the stockholders for both 
laons and stock was recorded in a suspense account with a 
subsequent reclassification of amounts to the respective 
accounts. The loans were not repaid at maturity and interest 
was accrued but was not paid on the notes. The corporation 
did repay the loan of one stockholder, plus accrued interest, 
but two years subsequent to the maturity date, and at the 
same time purchased his shares of common stock. Also detri­
mental to the taxpayer's case was the absence of demand by 
the stockholder-creditors for payment of principal and 
interest when due, the fact renewal notes were not issued 
when the notes matured, and that it would not have been rea­
sonably expected when the notes were issued that the principal 
would be repaid at maturity. Three of the four shareholders 
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loaned the corporation money in proportion to shareholder 
ownership. 
In Harkins Bowling, Inc. v. District Director1 stock­
holders advanced $91,000 to a corporation and were issued 
notes in the principal amount of $90,000 and capital stock 
of $1,000. Within the first year the corporation was in 
existence the stockholders advanced an additional $19,650 to 
the corporation and in exchange received notes. Considering 
only stockholder held debt, the debt-equity ratio was 109 
to 1, but inclusion of debt to other creditors resulted in 
a debt-equity ratio of 366 to 1. The stockholder advances 
which were exchanged for notes were used to purchase assets 
necessary for the basic operation of the business. Advances 
by stockholders in exchange for notes were proportional to 
each stockholder's equity interest in the corporation. The 
court, in this case, considered the above criteria indicative 
of an eqUity interest. The court also considered whether a 
commercial lender would have loaned the corporation money 
with a stockholder investment of only $1,000. Evidence pre­
sented showed that a commercial lender would not have loaned 
the corporation money unless the stockholders advanced 
$91,000 and subordinated stockholder held debt to the lender's 
loan. Expectation of repayment of the stockholder held debt 
1Harkins Bowling, Inc. y. District Director, 164 F. 
Supp. 801 (1958). 
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was, in effect, contingent upon very substantial corporate 
earnings. Secured debt repayment of outsiders had to be paid 
first from earnings and enforced payment of stockholder held 
debt would have jeopardized the financial condition of the 
corporation. For the above reasons the court decided that 
the stockholder held notes in Harkins Bowling represented an 
equity investment. 
In Affiliated Research, Inc. v. United States 1 three 
brothers who were shareholders in a family corporation and an 
estate in which the brothers were co-executors and sale bene­
ficiaries advanced money to the corporation and received in 
return promissory notes. The money was advanced by the stock­
holders so the corporation could purchase capital stock of 
another company. The stockholder loans were evidenced by 
promissory notes which were payable on demand, but for almost 
the entire period involved the notes were subordinated to the 
indebtedness of other corporate creditors. Repayment of the 
promissory notes by the plaintiff corporation was dependent 
on substantial earnings by the company in which they had 
purchased shares of stock. Each stockholder's portion of the 
indebtedness was proportional to his stock ownership. The 
ratio of shareholder debt to equity was approXimately 72 to 
1, while the debt-equity ratio was 1J1 to 1 if bank loans 
1Affiliated Research, Inc. v. United States, J51 F. 
2d 646 (Ct. Cl. 1965;. 
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safeguards required 
this corporation with the 
in connection with stockholder 
demonstrate 
decision would be 
hand, and, 
lending institutions 
of securities, and 
stockholders required 
position of greater 
of Affiliated 
were included. The court compared the 
by the banks in loaning money to 
absence of the same safeguards 
held debt. The court stated: 
Perhaps the most effective way to 
certain of the reasons for our 
to contrast the bank loans, on the one 
on the othe" the advances by the Freydbergs and 
the estate. 
The court concluded that the outside 
required personal guarantees, the pledge 
subordination of other loans while the 
no such protection which placed them in a 
risk. The court held that the promissory notes 
Research, Inc. represented equity ownership. 
In securing funds for operation in Utility Trailer 
2Manufacturing Company v. United states plaintiff corporation 
made it a practice to borrow from banks for current financing 
and to borrow from stockholders, key employees, and relatives 
of stockholders for long term financing. The loans from 
stockholders and key employees began in 1941. On September 
30, 1949 promissory notes then aggregating $367,500 were 
cancelled and new unsecured promissory notes were issued which 
extended the maturity dates of the notes. On October 31, 195Z 
1Ibid ., at 648. 
2utility Trailer Manufacturing Company v. United 
States, 212 F. Supp. 773 (1962). 
58 
them into stock. 
additional 
stockholders 
were issued 
for notes 
were 
notes 
as a 
the promissory notes issued in 1949 were exchanged for notes 
which gave the holder the option to convert 
Between October Jl, 1952 and April 1, 1954 an 
$195,JOO was borrowed by the corporation from 
and key employees and unsecured promissory notes 
in exchange. On April 1, 1954 the corporation issued notes 
in the aggregate amount of $557,700 in exchange 
which had previously been issued to shareholders and key 
employees. Notes with the aggregate amount of $5,100 
converted into common stock of the corporation. The 
issued on April 1, 1954 provided an escalation clause 
hedge against inflation which was computed with reference 
to the Consumer Price Index. The maturity dates for these 
notes ranged from September of 1965 to September of 1972. 
The court indicated that the notes of the Utility 
Trailer Manufacturing provided for a definite determinable 
dat. on which the principal was due even though no payment 
had been made on the principal of any of the notes. The 
absence of demand for repayment of principal of the notes 
was not considered by the court as evidence of the intent of 
stockholders and employees to treat the notes as equity capi­
tal. The court concluded that it was reasonable to assume 
that shareholders and employees intended when they loaned 
the money to have it repaid at maturity, but because of the 
continuous growth and expansion of the company, with the 
accompanying need for additional funds, had decided to extend 
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in reason-
was offset 
same time 
The notes 
claims of general 
to a loan by 
subordination 
factor indicative 
factor of sub-
stated: 
the maturities of the loans. The loans were made 
ably close proportion to stockholdings, but this 
by the fact that the loans were not made at the 
the stockholders purchased stock in the company. 
in question were not subordinated to the 
creditors but there was a limited subordination 
an insurance company. The court felt that the 
was so limited that it was not a significant 
of an equity interest. In referring to the 
ordination the court cited a case in which it was 
Subordination to general creditors is not neces­
sarily indicative of a stock interest. Debt is 
still debt despite subordination. 1 
The debt-equity ratio of the Utility Trailer Manu­
facturing Company was less than one to one and the court 
indicated that the corporation was not thinly capitalized. 
The defendant in this case had not questioned the deduction 
of interest paid to noteholders who were not stockholders. 
The court pointed out that this was illogical since the 
important factor was not who owned the notes, but instead 
the true nature of the notes. The court held that the 
alleged notes of the Utility Trailer Manufacturing Company 
did in fact represent indebtedness. 
1Kraft Foods Company v. Commissioner, 232 F. 2d, 118, 
125 (2d Cir. 1956). 
60 
Com­
maturity 
it was 
on 
a stock-
The court in O. H. Kruse Grain & Milling v. 
.. 1 f d m~ss~oner oun most of the governing attributes lacking in 
a promissory note held by the major stockholder. The 
date of the note was certain only to the extent that 
payable on or before a specified date or thereafter 
demand. The stockholder and his wife, who was also 
holder, owned 100 per cent of the stock which indicated that 
there was complete identity of interest between noteholder 
and stockholder. The note was subordinated to the claims 
of other creditors for most of the period the note was out­
standing. The noteholder-stockholder participated in manage­
ment, evidence of a bona. fide business purpose for the note 
issuance was not presented, and payments were made on the 
principal of the demand note only after internal revenue 
authorities questioned the genuineness of the note. No evi­
dence was presented to show that the money could have been 
borrowed from outside sources, but the court indicated that 
due to the liberal provisions of the note the probability of 
a lending institution granting such a loan was small. The 
court found only the form of the promissory note to be indi­
cative of indebtedness and held that the alleged note 
represented an equity interest. 
The sole shareholder in P. M. Finance Corporation v. 
10..H KG'ruse ra~n &...Milling. v.• Commissioner, 279 F. 2d, 
123 (9th-Cir. 1960). 
,~~lh-,.g------------ •••__'.~".
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1 
Commissioner purchased oapital stock in the corporation with 
the par value equal to the cost of $10,000. The sole share­
holder also advanced $90,000 to the corporation and received 
in exchange debenture bonds with a principal amount of 
$90,000. SUbsequently his wife purchased debenture bonds of 
the corporation with a principal amount of $50,000. The 
corporation also borrowed very substantial sums from banks. 
The corporation under review was in the business of lending 
money to finance purchases of tap rooms and cocktail lounges. 
The collateral backing the corporation's notes receivable 
was pledged to the banks as security for loans. Since 
borrowed capital, in large amounts, is customary in the 
finance business, the debt-equity ratios which ranged from 
7:1 down to ):1 were not considered by the court to be too 
high. The complete identity of interest between the bond­
holder-sole shareholder and his wife, the other bondholder, 
was a factor indicating that the bonds represented equity. 
In this regard the court stated: 
To the sole shareholder-creditor it may make little 
difference, taxation aside, whether his investment be 
labeled debt rather than stock. Complete control of 
the corporation will enable him to render nugatory the 
absolute language of any instrument of indebtedness. 2 
The subordination of the bonds to bank loans was the 
1p • M. Finance Corporation v. Commissioner, 302 F. 2d, 
786 (Jrd-C ir. 19(2). 
2 p • M. Finance Corporation y. commi~sioner. suP3a)at 302 F. 2d at 789, J02 F. 2d, 786, 789 3rd Cir. 19 2 •56, 
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major factor the court considered in deciding that the bonds 
represented an equity interest. The subordination was complete 
and bondholders could not demand payment of the bond principal 
at a fixed maturity date nor could they share with general 
creditors in the assets of the corporation upon liquidation 
or dissolution. It was basic to the operation of this busi­
ness that bank loans be sustained at a high level and this, 
combined with the sUbordination, meant that the debentures 
would not be subject to payment for an indefinite period of 
time which would probably extend for the period of time the 
corporation existed. 
1The Colony, Inc. corporation was organized with a 
total capital of $1,000 and indebtedness payable to stock­
holders of $57,800. Bank loans totaling $149,000 were 
obtained and were secured by liens on real estate owned by 
the corporation. The promissory notes issued to stockholders 
were unsecured, were not repaid at maturity, but were issued 
in amounts that were disproportionate to stockholdings. 
Representatives of the taxpayer corporation conceded that it 
was thinly capitalized. The debt-equity ratio counting only 
stockholder held debt was 58 to 1, and the inclusion of 
indebtedness to outsiders increased the ratio to 207 to 1. 
The court considered the nominal stock investment, the 
1The Colony, Inc., 26 T.G., 30 (1956), aff'd without 
discussion of this point, 357 u.s. 28 (1958). 
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excessive debt structure, implied subordination by the 
parties, and the absence of enforcement of principal payment 
of the notes at maturity to indicate that the stockholders 
intended for the alleged loans to be risked in the business 
as a capital contribution. 
1In Emanuel N. Kolkey three individuals who owned all 
of the stock in a corporation transferred their stock to a 
newly organized corporation in exchange for promissory notes 
with an aggregate amount of $4,000,000. There was a stock 
investment of $1,000. The court in holding that the alleged 
promissory notes represented equity emphasized the nominal 
stock investment, the excessive debt structure, the fact that 
the business operation of the new corporation was nearly 
identical to that of the former corporation and the absence 
of intent of the parties to enforce collection of the 
promissory notes. 
Three joint owners of certain real estate formed Burr 
2Oaks Corporation and transferred the real estate to the 
corporation in exchange for promissory notes. Each of the 
individuals received promissory notes with a face value of 
$110,000. Wives or brothers of the three individuals pur­
chased capital stock at a cost of $4,500. The control of 
corporate affairs was exercised by the three noteholders 
1Emanuel N. Kolkey, 27 T.G. 37 (1956), aff'd 254 F. 
2d 51 (7th Gir. 1958). 
2Burr Oaks Corporation, 43 T.G., 635 (1965), aff'd 
365 F. 2~ {7th Gir. 1966). 
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rather than the stockholders. The court emphasized the 
nominal stock investment, excessive debt structure, the 
absence of intent to enforce collection of the note princi­
pal, and the control of corporate affairs by the noteholders. 
It was also pointed out that the source of interest and 
principal payments would have to be from earnings derived 
from the successful operation of a risky and speculative 
business. The court held that the alleged promissory notes 
represented an equity interest. 
The criteria generally used by the courts in 
determining whether amounts advanced to a corporation, by 
its stockholders, represented indebtedness or equity capital 
were stated in the opinion of a United states Court of 
Appeals case. These criteria were: (1) the names given to 
the certificates evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the 
presence or absence of a maturity date; (J) the source of 
the payments; (4) the right to enforce the payment of 
principal and interest; (5) participation in management; 
(6) a status equal to or inferior to that of regular corpor­
ate creditors; (7) the intent of the parties; (8) thin or 
adequate capitalization; (9) identity of interest between 
creditor and stockholder; (10) payment of interest only out 
of dividend money; (11) the ability of the corporation to 
1 
obtain loans from outside lending institutions. These same 
1Montclair, Inc., v. Commissioner, J18 F. 2d, J8, 40
 
(5th Cir. 19~J).
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factors were used by the court in a case previously cited. 1 
In a very recent case decided in a United States 
2
District court and appealed to a United States Court of 
Appeals the same criteria were used in determining whether 
alleged indebtedness did in fact represent indebtedness or 
equity. The corporation was organized in 1955 for the pur­
pose of constructing, owning, and operating a professional 
office building. For each share of stock purchased the stock­
holder agreed to advance $400 to the corporation as a loan. 
Originally the loans were evidenced by promissory notes, but 
two years after the corporation was organized debentures were 
substituted for the notes. The debentures provided for 
7 per cent interest payment, which was cumulative, and 
accumulated interest had to be paid before dividends on 
capital stock could be declared. The principal of the 
debentures was payable on or before 19 years subsequent to 
the date of issuance and maturity could be accelerated for 
any default other than the failure to pay interest. The 
debentures were freely transferable and were secured by a 
pledge of the full faith and credit of the issuer by a lien 
upon all excess lease rentals received by the corporation 
and the proceeds, if any, of a stockholder's loan sinking 
10 • H. Kruse Grain & Milling v. Commissioner, supra 
at 55, 279 F. 2d at 125. 
1661 Corporation .y. Laurie W. Tomlinson, 247 F.2The 
Supp. 9J~(1965), aff'd Commerce Clearing House, 67-1 U.S.T.C. 
84-210 (5th Cir. 1967). 
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fund to which no deposits had been made. The debentures were 
subordinated to the mortgage indebtedness on corporate 
property. 
The court considered that the identity of ownership 
between debenture holders and stockholders of The 1661 
Corporation and the stockholders' proportional holding of 
debentures and stock was offset by the free transference of 
the debentures. The fact the status of debenture holders 
was inferior to that of a mortgage holder was offset by the 
equal status of debenture holders and general creditors of 
the corporation. The court concluded that the debt-equity 
ratio, which was 4:1, if only stockholder held debt was 
included, and 14.6:1 if all debt was included, was not 
excessive. The court also indicated that there was a 
definite right to enforce payment of debenture principal 
upon default or at maturity. The corporation had accrued 
interest on the debentures for several years, but the 
interest remained unpaid. The court gave very little weight 
to the fact that debenture holders had not exercised their 
right to enforce payment of interest. In discussing intent 
the court referred to a prior case wherein they had stated: 
Where the instruments involved are entirely con­
ventional in form and contain no ambiguity on their 
face the problem is not one of ascertaining intent 
sinc; the parties have objectively manifested their 
intent. It is a problem of whether the intent and 
acts of these parties should be disregarded in 
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tax 
Corporation could 
interest 
characterizing the transaction for federal 
purposes. 1 
The court concluded tha.t The 1661 
have secured loans from outside sources, but the 
rate was prohibitively high. The court held that the debentures 
represented indebtedness. 2 
Many of the criteria used by the courts in prior 
periods were used by the courts during this period to deter­
mine whether an instrument represented indebtedness or equity. 
The debt-equity ratio was not emphasized as much by the 
courts. Between 1946 and 1956 a debt-equity ratio of 4:1 or 
less was considered by the majority of courts to indicate 
that the debt structure was not excessive. Several of the 
cases during this period involved corporations with a debt-
equity ratio of 1:1 or less in which the court held that 
instruments under review did not represent bona fide 
indebtedness. 
The ability of a corporation to obtain loans from 
outside lending institutions is a factor that was first used 
by the courts during this period. If an outside creditor 
in an arms length transaction would loan the corporation 
money, this was a factor which indicated that the risk 
attendant to the loan was not so great as to preclude 
1United States v. Snyder Brothers Company, 367 F. 2d, 
980, 982 (5th Cir. 196"6). 
2Tomlinson v. The 1661 Corporation, Commerce Clearing 
House, 67-1 U.S.T.C. 84-2T015 th Cir. 1967). 
.-----------------••••••••••••lll+.~ 
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stockholder advances from being given the status of bona fide 
indebtedness. 
The factor of identity of interest between creditor 
and stockholders was expanded during the current period. 
Prior to this period stockholders holding the same proportion 
of indebtedness and stock was detrimental in proving that 
H·	 indebtedness was bona fide. Proportional holdings of debt 
and stock continued as a factor indicating indebtedness. 
The Gooding Amusement Company1 expanded the doctrine of 
identity of interest. The complete dependence of certain 
stockholders on the decisions of the major stockholder made 
it apparent that only the intent of the major stockholder 
was important. 
Practically all of the cases decided by the courts 
during this period involved instruments which in form 
satisfied the requirements for indebtedness. The courts 
concentrated on the substance of an alleged indebtedness 
arrangement in deciding whether a security represented 
indebtedness or equity. The substance of an alleged 
indebtedness arrangement was closely related to objective 
intent. The criterion of intent was not governed by what 
a. taxpayer subjectively intended, but by what could 
rea.sonably be inferred from the terms and conditions of the 
instrument and evidence outside the contract. 
1Gooding Amusement Company, §upra at 43. 
\~~~.c-------------- ._._ 
during this period appearedlThe approach of the courts 
to be more comprehensive with emphasis on the economic reality 
of a transaction as opposed to formal characteristics of 
indebtedness. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The court's interpretation of the concepts of 
corporate indebtedness and equity resulting from share­
holder loans and investments has changed sUbstantially 
between 1913 and the present. The criteria developed by 
the courts in the earlier years have been used by the courts 
up to the present. In addition the courts have developed 
and added significant new criteria to judge whether 
instruments represent debt or equity. In the pre-1946 
period courts concentrated primarily on the formal aspects 
of the stockholder-creditor arrangement and the subjective 
intent of the parties to the transaction. The courts have 
gradually changed the emphasis and they now concentrate more 
on the substantive aspects of a shareholder-creditor arrange­
ment and the objective intent of the parties to the 
transaction. The following summarizes factors the courts 
consider in interpreting the concepts of corporate indebted­
ness and equity resulting from shareholder loans and 
investments. 
The courts have consistently considered the name of 
an instrument since, "it is not lightly to be assumed that 
the parties have given an erroneous name to their 
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1transaction. 11 The name of an instrument, however, is not 
conclusive evidence that a security represents indebtedness 
since the real character of the instrument may be different 
from the name by which it is denominated. 2 The real character 
of an instrument named debenture preference stockJ was found 
by the courts to be indebtedness. The consistency of using 
the instrument's name in other corporate records is also 
important in determining the intent of the parties. Minutes 
and resolutions of board of directors meetings and stock­
holder agreements should consistently refer to the name of 
4
the instrument. The use of suspense accounts to record 
advances from shareholders in the financial records should 
be avoided. 5 
The presence or absence of a fixed maturity date in an 
instrument is important in proving to the courts that a debtor-
creditor relationship was intended. Some court decisions 
indicate that a fixed maturity date for the principal sum is 
the most significant and essential feature of a debtor-creditor 
relationship. 6 However, a fixed maturity date for a security 
1APpeal of Kentucky River Coal Corporation, supra at 
19, J B.T.A., at 649. 
2Appeal of Leasehold Realty Company, supra at 10. 
J The Proctor Shop, Incorporated, supra at 11. 
4Appeal of I. Unterberg & Company, supra at 2J. 
5Broadway Drive-In rheatre, Inc. v. United States, 
supra at 49. 
6parisian, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 19. 
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does not conclusively prove that an instrument represents 
indebtedness since it may lack certain other essential 
1 
features. In the opinion of a court decision it was 
indicated that it is not uncommon	 for preferred stock to 
2provide for a fixed maturity date. When debt securities 
are issued the maturity date should be either fixed or 
determinable. 
Another feature of a debtor-creditor relationship 
the courts have considered essential is certainty that the 
principal indebtedness will be repaid. This feature was 
given great weight in one court opinion when it was stated, 
" the final criterion between creditor and shareholder we 
believe to be the contingency of payment. ,,3 The right to 
enforce payment of the principal indebtedness upon default 
or at mauurity has been a criterion construed by the courts 
to indicate a debtor-creditor relationship. Shareholder 
loans secured by the pledge of collateral or by a mortgage 
have a greater probability of being interpreted by the courts 
as representing indebtedness. Subordination of the claims 
of shareholder-creditors to the claims of general creditors 
is construed by the courts as an attribute indicating that 
1p • M. Finance Corporation v. Commissioner, 302 F. 2d 
786 (3rd-Ci;. 1962). 
2APpeal of Leasehold R~alty Company, supra at 10. 
3Commissioner v. O. P. P. Holding Corporation, supra 
at 12, 76 F. 2d at 12~ 
7J 
shareholder loans are risk capital. Subordination of share­
holder loans to specific claims of corporate creditors is 
not necessarily fatal to the taxpayer's proving his case to 
1 
the court. Creditor safeguards are many and varied, but 
normal creditor protection should be provided in a share­
holder-Iaon agreement. 
Instruments of indebtedness should provide for a fixed 
rate of interest payable in all instances. The corporation 
should be unconditionally bound to pay a definitely ascer­
tainable amount of interest without regard to corporate 
profits or retained earnings. The requirement that the source 
of interest payments must be corporate profits or retained 
earnings has been viewed by the courts as a factor indicative 
2
of a stockholding interest. Conversely an unconditional 
requirement by the corporation to pay a fixed amount of 
interest under all circumstances is considered by the courts 
as indicative of indebtedness. J The right of stockholder-
creditors to share in corporate profits beyond a fixed 
interest rate is generally considered by the courts as 
indicative of a stockholding relationship.4 Generally the 
courts indicate that cumulative interest payments provide 
1Tomlinson ~. The 1661 Corporation, supra at 60. 
2d 611 
2 C . . omm~ss~oner v. 
(2d Cir. 1940):-
Schmoll Fil Associated,
------­ -­
Inc.,
_.­
110 F. 
JThe Toledo Blade Company, supra at 40. 
4Haffenreffer Brewing Company v. Commissioner, supra. 
at 20. 
evidence of indebtedness,1 but this may not be reliable since 
in many instances dividends on preferred shares are cumula­
tive. The right of stockholder-creditors to enforce 
collection of interest upon default is considered by the 
courts as a criterion favoring the interpretation of bona 
2fide indebtedness. An instrument that provides with 
certainty that interest will be paid is viewed favorably by 
the courts in a debt-equity determination. 
The courts generally construe the right of security 
holders to vote or participate in the management of corporate 
affairs as a feature indicative of a stockholding interest. 3 
The absence of these features can be indicative of an 
4indebtedness interest.
Much has been covered in this study about the debt-
equity ratio. For several years a debt-equity ratio. For 
several years a debt-equity ratio of 4:1 or less was con­
sidered by taxpayers as safe. Taxpayers felt that within 
these limits courts would not interpret the corporation's 
debt structure to be excessive or the stock investment to 
1C • . v. o. P. P. Holding Corporation, supra 
at 12. 
omm~ss~oner 
2The Proctor Shop, Incorporated, supra at 11 • 
3Fellinger v. United States, supra at 48. 
4 Commissioner, 326 u.S. 521John Kelle* Company v. (7th Cir. 1944) reversing 1(1946) r;v;rsing 1 6 F. 2d 466 
T.C. 457 (1943). 
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. 1 1 nom~nabe • Since the Gooding Amusement Company2 case the 
debt-equity ratio has not been given as much weight by the 
courts. The debt-equity ratio is still one of the criteria 
considered by the courts. Corporations with excessive debt 
structures or nominal stock investments still run the risk 
of having alleged instruments of indebtedness interpreted by 
the courts to represent equity interests. Lower debt-equity 
ratios are less probable of equity interpretation by the 
courts. 
A bona fide business purpose for creating a share-
holder-creditor arrangement generally supports the taxpayer's 
contention that the indebtedness is genuine. Conversely, if 
the transaction has tax avoidance as its primary purpose, 
then the courts tend to construe this factor as indicative 
of a stockholding relationship. Several examples of a bona 
fide business purpose for a debtor-creditor transaction are 
included in this study. Possible business purposes are many, 
but a business purpose other than a tax avoidance provides a 
favorable criterion pointing to bona fide indebtedness. 
Identity of interest between creditor and stockholder 
is a factor that has been consistently considered by the 
courts in debt-equity determinations. Alleged indebtedness 
which involves stockholders who are also the creditors is a 
1
-_._._.-Ibid • 
- ---
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factor indicating a stockholding relationship. 1 This is 
especially true when the stockholder held debt is divided 
among stockholders in the same proportion as their stock-
holdings. The courts tend to construe proportionate hold­
ings of stock and stockholder debt as leaving stockholders 
in the same position of risk with the same participation in 
management of corporate affairs as would have been the case 
if they had invested money in the corporation. Where cer­
tain stockholder-creditors have not operated independently 
of other stockholder-creditors the intent of the controlling 
2party has been determined. Disproportionate holdings of 
stock and debt and independence of action by stockholder 
creditors have been viewed favorably by the courts as 
criteria indicating bona fide indebtedness. 
The courts have indicated the ability of a corporation 
to obtain a loan from an outside lending institution lends 
credence to the authenticity of a stockholder loan arrange­
ment.) An arms length transaction with a lending institution 
shows that the relative degree of risk attributable to a 
stockholder loan is commensurate with a creditor arrangement. 
It is just within the last few years that this criterion has 
1Tomlinson v. The 1661 Corporation, supra at 60. 
2Gooding Amusement Company, supra at 69. 
)Montclair, Inc. v. Commissioner, )18 F. 2d 40 (5th 
Gir. 196). 
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been used by the courts. This factor provides the courts 
with an objective standard which is evidence that a stock­
holder loan has the relative degree of risk appropriate to 
a creditor status. 
Throughout the whole period of this study intent of 
the parties to a transaction has been considered in 
determining whether a security represented indebtedness or 
equity. The intent of the parties has been determined by 
the use of the criteria discussed above and evidence outside 
the contract. It appears that the courts in the early years 
determined intent by the formal aspects of the instrument 
itself and the subjective intent of the parties to the 
transaction. Recent court opinions reveal the court's 
emphasis on the substance of a shareholder-creditor arrange­
ment and what can reasonably and objectively be inferred py 
the acts of the parties involved. An example of this 
1
substantive approach was cited in a very recent case. 
Each of the criteria reviewed above have been 
important in debt-equity determinations. The courts have 
been consistent in stating that each case must be judged on 
the facts presented and that no one factor is conclusive in 
determining whether a security represents indebtedness or 
equity. Stockholders in a closely held corporation planning 
the use of stockholder debt in their financial structure 
1United states v. Snyder Brothers Company, 367 F. 2d 
980 (5thCir. 19b6). 
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should review the criteria discussed above and plan the debt 
structure accordingly. There is no formula which insures 
stockholder-creditors that their loans will be interpreted 
by the courts as bona fide, but the greater the number of 
criteria established in the debtor-creditor arrangement the 
greater the probability that the courts will find that a 
genuine creditor relationship exists. 
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